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Abstract: This conceptual paper extends the traditional view of disruptive change, which considers the effects of rivalry between an incumbent 
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context of three historical, disruptive innovation cases; Bakelite (a synthetic plastic), microwave oven, and photocopier. Through these cases, we 
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framework that can guide future research.
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Introduction
A long line of research has addressed the detrimental effects radical 
changes in the technological landscape can have upon firms (e.g. Tus-
hman and Anderson, 1986; Bourreau et al., 2012; Carlsson, 2016). 
Following the ‘creative destruction’ argument of Schumpeter (1942), 
scholars have developed various frameworks to examine the evolu-
tion and revolution of technology-based industries. One of the most 
prominent frameworks has been introduced by Christensen (1997) 
to analyse the changes in the industry and the market, subsequent to 
the emergence of a so-called ‘disruptive innovation’. Unable to find 
a foothold among mainstream customers due to its lack of perfor-
mance, this new product initially serves a niche segment, beyond the 
strategic radar of incumbent firms competing for the mainstream 
market. Over time, however, the innovation attains sufficient perfor-
mance levels to penetrate the larger customer segments and enter into 
rivalry with the incumbent technology, often displacing the latter due 
a different value proposition that is seen to be comparatively better. 
Unaware of the potential threat caused by the disruptive innovation, 
incumbent firms are compelled to exit the industry (e.g. Sandberg 
and Hansén, 2004; Currah, 2007; Da Silva et al., 2013).
Notwithstanding the value of this widely used theoretical model, the-
re is growing interest in the way organisations create value collectively 
rather than as singular units (e.g. Adner, 2012; Adner, 2017). Hen-
ce, while the disruptive innovation framework is able to explain the 
consequences of radical innovations upon individual firms, there is 
need for greater understanding of the influence of disruption upon 
the larger, systemic context (see Adner and Kapoor, 2016a for a recent 
treatment of this issue). We subsequently aim to conceptualise the 
impact of disruption upon the ‘innovation ecosystem’, which conno-
tes the heterogeneous set of organisations whose interactions deliver a 
holistic value proposition to the end-user (Moore, 1993; Garnsey and 
Leong, 2008; Brown, 2016). In line with Christensen’s contributions, 
which have been to divulge the mechanisms of disruption and the 
derivation of implications for the incumbent (and disrupting) firm, 
our paper aims to illuminate how the innovation ecosystem changes 
subject to its disruption by a radically new technology, and arrive at 
implications for the firms that constitute the ecosystem. We feel this 
to be highly valuable for practitioners in particular, providing a more 
comprehensive analytical lens in their evaluation of the competitive 
environment. 
Our conceptualisation essentially extends the traditional view of dis-
ruption as that resulting from the rivalry between incumbent and 
disrupting firms, to that ensuing between incumbent and disruptive 
innovation ecosystems. To understand the systemic effects of disrup-
tion, we employ the notion of the ‘value blueprint’ advocated by Ad-
ner (2012), which denotes the schema of actors and their connections 
necessary to deliver the innovation ecosystem’s value proposition. Fo-
llowing Adner’s (2017) suggestion that specific value propositions are 
delivered by unique ecosystem structures, we establish the premise 
that the value blueprint of the disruptive innovation ecosystem will be 
inherently different to that of the incumbent innovation ecosystem. 
Hence, from the perspective of any given actor in the ecosystem, the 
advent of disruption will essentially reconfigure the incumbent va-
lue blueprint as actors and their connections are necessarily adjusted. 
Some of these alterations may be detrimental while others reinforce 
the position of actors. 
In our conceptual work we discuss the variables that may explain 
such reconfiguration, and derive propositions to explain how innova-
tion ecosystem value blueprints are altered subsequent to disruptive 
technological change. We then review these propositions in light of 
three illustrative cases of disruptive innovation, namely, Bakelite (a 
fully synthetic plastic), the microwave oven, and the photocopier. In 
each of these cases, we use historical data to compare the value blue-
prints of the incumbent and disruptive innovation ecosystems. This 
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comparison essentially describes the reconfiguration of the incum-
bent ecosystem subject to disruption, as actors are added, subtracted, 
relocated, combined, or separated. In this manner, our work extends 
Adner’s (2017) recent contribution that focuses more generically on 
the delivery of a new value proposition bought about by ecosystem 
structure reconfiguration. We conclude our paper by reviewing our 
conceptually derived propositions and illustrations, to propose a 
stylised framework, which can guide future research endeavours.
Theoretical background
Innovation ecosystems
The innovation ecosystem can be broadly defined as a set of orga-
nisations, which produces a holistic, integrated technological system 
(e.g. personal computers, smart watches, and online marketplaces) 
that creates value for customers (Teece, 2007; Agerfalk and Fitzge-
rald, 2008; Basole, 2009). This heterogeneous coalition may include 
suppliers, complementors, system integrators, and customers, to-
gether with distributors, advertisers, finance providers (e.g. venture 
capitalists, corporate investors, investment bankers, and angel inves-
tors), universities and research institutions, regulatory authorities 
and standard-setting bodies, and the judiciary (Whitley and Darking, 
2006; Iyer and Davenport, 2008; Pierce, 2009;). Collectively, these 
actors “co-evolve capabilities around a new innovation” by working 
cooperatively as well as competitively in the creation of products and 
services (Moore, 1993). The mobile phone ecosystem (Basole, 2009), 
Amazon’s web service ecosystem (Isckia, 2009), and Google’s innova-
tion ecosystem (Iyer and Davenport, 2008), are just some examples of 
ecosystems that centre on respective innovations. 
Commensurate with its biological metaphor origins, some scholars 
have emphasised the indispensability of the ‘keystone’ (Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004) or ‘platform leader’ (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002) that 
lies at the core of the innovation ecosystem. The keystone’s role is to 
regulate the overall function of the ecosystem and as a consequen-
ce its actions influence the success of all other members. Firms such 
as Microsoft, Apple, and Mozilla have been crucial platform leaders, 
ensuring the continued development of their respective ecosystems 
(Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; Tiwana et al., 2010). The keystone is 
supported by a further category of actors referred to as ‘niche players’, 
which undertake specialised functions. Niche players can also be re-
ferred to as ‘complementors’ given that their specialised contribution 
is complementary to the core function of the platform leader, and 
which helps expand the realms of the latter’s products and services. 
In this manner, by focusing on the “communities of associated actors 
defined by their networks and platforms affiliations” (Adner, 2017, 
p.40), scholars assume what Adner (2017) refers to as an “ecosystem-
as-affiliation” perspective of innovation ecosystems.
In this paper, we predominantly employ the alternative, “ecosystem-
as-structure” perspective of the innovation ecosystem advanced by 
Adner (2017), underscoring the “configurations of activity defined 
by a value proposition” (Adner, 2017, p.40). Lying at the core of this 
view is the ecosystem’s value proposition, which defines the bene-
fits that the end-user will accrue from acquiring the final product. 
In turn, the value proposition defines the set of actors whose inte-
ractions and alignment structures (i.e. defined positions and acti-
vity flows) will ultimately bring the proposition to fruition (Adner, 
2017). It therefore follows that even when the same set of actors 
are involved, reconfiguring the ecosystem’s structural alignment will 
deliver a different value propositions, and therefore denote two di-
fferent ecosystems.
To assist organisations in recognising the ecosystem surrounding them 
and analysing the process of value creation, Adner (2012) additionally 
proposes the notion of a ‘value blueprint’. Specifically, the value blue-
print is a schema of the actors and the connections between these actors 
that constitute the innovation ecosystem. Within in this schema, we 
can identify three generic categories of actors with respect to a focal 
firm: (i) suppliers (i.e. upstream actors), whose products are integrated 
into the focal firm’s own offering; (ii) complementors (i.e. actors off the 
direct-path of value creation), whose products complement that of the 
focal firm; and (iii) customers, (i.e. the downstream actors, including 
intermediaries) who integrate the offering of the focal firm and com-
plementors to acquire enhanced value. The basic, generic unit of the 
innovation ecosystem value blueprint is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Generic value blueprint (adapted from Adner 2012, p. 87).
While the traditionally used value chain (e.g. Porter, 1985) and supply 
chain (e.g. Simchi-Levi, 2005) depictions “tend to focus on the linear 
sequence of handoffs from suppliers to producers to distributors 
to end customers, the value blueprint is explicit about the specific 
location and links of complementors that lie off the direct path to 
market but are nonetheless critical for success” (Adner 2012, p. 84). A 
significant benefit of the value blueprint framework is the identifica-
tion of the location risks, or potential bottlenecks, which can curb the 
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development of the ecosystem as a whole. The removal of these bloc-
kages emerges as most pertinent in promoting ecosystem evolution 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Mäkinen and Dedehayir, 2013). 
The interdependence of ecosystem members and the products they 
contribute is therefore a prime driver of ecosystem development. Un-
der these circumstances, the presence of a clear platform architecture 
promotes co-evolutionary processes in ecosystems where complemen-
tors and component makers produce distinct technological sub-sys-
tems (Li, 2009). The platform leader plays a central role in this change 
dynamic, and has strong motivation to design the ecosystem’s archi-
tecture, which must be done by forecasting future changes given the 
often irreversible nature of platform architecture (Tiwana et al., 2010). 
Such platform design can be aided by ‘decomposition’, which connotes 
the breaking down of the architecture in a hierarchical manner into its 
constituent sub-systems. The benefit of decomposition is the reduction 
of interdependence between the evolutionary processes of components 
that make up the ecosystem, which in turn accelerates the evolution of 
sub-systems while concurrently reducing ecosystem complexity (for a 
recent discussion of interdependence and timing issues in ecosystems 
see Adner and Kapoor, 2016b). An element that is central to the design 
of architectures is therefore the degree of independence between sub-
systems, referred to as ‘modularity’ (e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 2003).
Platform architectures can vary from highly modular to highly inte-
grated in their designs. Architectures that classify in the latter end of 
the spectrum face the challenge of cascading effects as changes in one 
sub-system are reverberated throughout the ecosystem. Platform lea-
ders that design platform architectures can increase modularity by de-
coupling sub-systems and standardising the interfaces between them 
such that they are predefined and stable. Following the arguments of 
modular systems theory (e.g. Schilling, 2000), we may infer that in-
novation ecosystems displaying a high degree of modularisation are 
likely to experience a higher rate of evolution, because modules can 
evolve independently of others, with less need for coordination and 
understanding of the internal functioning of other modules. At the 
same time, the costs incurred in coordination and management of 
dependencies with other modules and the platform is reduced in mo-
dular ecosystems, which once again benefits the evolution of modules 
and the ecosystem as a whole (Tiwana et al., 2010).
Disruption of innovation ecosystems
Disruptive innovations cause paradigm shifts and establish new tra-
jectories of technological improvement (e.g. Bower and Christensen, 
1995; Christensen, 1997). Because a disruptive innovation initially 
lacks the performance levels necessary to compete with the incumbent 
technology along value dimensions that are most pertinent to mains-
tream customers, it is nurtured in a separate (e.g. nascent or emer-
gent) market that appreciates a different value proposition. However, 
through a series of improvements, the disruptive innovation attains 
the necessary performance levels valued by the mainstream market, 
and offers a competitive solution to that of the incumbent technolo-
gy. Moreover, the disruptive innovation is highly competitive among 
mainstream customers because it additionally carries the value 
proposition that has been central in its initial nurturing market. 
Disruption triggers a period of competition among the firms that 
provide the incumbent and disruptive innovations, potentially resul-
ting in the incumbent firms’ replacement by the firms that introduce 
the new innovation. Christensen’s description of disruptive chan-
ge subsequently has profound implications for the incumbent firm, 
however, the impact of disruption upon the actors that are directly 
(or indirectly) connected with the incumbent firm – i.e. the incum-
bent innovation ecosystem – is not considered in this description. To 
understand the impact of disruption on the incumbent innovation 
ecosystem, we begin by considering its value blueprint depicted in 
Figure 1. Following the “ecosystem-as-structure” perspective (Ad-
ner, 2017), this schema presents the constellation of organisations 
that collaborate in delivering the incumbent value proposition to the 
end-user. However, the introduction of a disruptive innovation brings 
with it a radical shift in the attributes appreciated by customers in this 
market, commensurate with Christensen’s (1997) framework. This new 
value proposition will be delivered by an innovation ecosystem that 
is different from the incumbent with respect to its structure, in other 
words, the position of actors and the flow of activities between them, 
no matter whether the same actors are present or not (Adner, 2017). 
The emergence of a disruptive innovation thus brings two innovation 
ecosystems into rivalry, and the succession of the disruptive ecosystem 
over the incumbent establishes a new structure of actors and connec-
tions – essentially reconfiguring the incumbent ecosystem’s value blue-
print. This reconfiguration can be brought about by: (i) ‘relocation’ of 
actors and the tasks allocated to them; (ii) ‘separation’ of a single task 
into separate tasks to be undertaken by different actors; (iii) ‘combina-
tion’ of separate tasks to be undertaken by a single actor; (iv) ‘addition’ 
of new actors to undertake tasks that are currently absent but would 
benefit the ecosystem; and (v) ‘subtraction’ of existing actors and their 
tasks to benefit the ecosystem (Adner, 2012). Through these reconfigu-
ration mechanisms, we may, for instance, anticipate the replacement 
(i.e. subtraction followed by addition) of the incumbent focal firm in 
Figure 1 by the focal firm of the disrupting ecosystem, when the pro-
duct of the latter substitutes for that of the former. This process aligns 
with Christensen’s model, which considers the rivalry between the 
incumbent firm and new entrant. However, for the other actors that 
constitute the incumbent ecosystem (i.e. lying upstream, downstream, 
and in complementary positions in the ecosystem’s value blueprint), we 
suggest that the manifestation of relocation, separation, combination, 
addition, or subtraction processes will be governed by two key factors: 
(i) the nature of the disruptive innovation; and (ii) the degree of modu-
larity of the incumbent product or service. 
The traditional mode of disruptive change described by Christensen 
(1997), referred to as low-end disruption, is characterised by the lower 
unit price and design simplicity of the disruptive innovation in com-
parison to the incumbent. Through these product traits the disrupti-
ve innovation attracts the price-sensitive segments of the mainstream 
market at first, and then gradually captures the less price-sensitive seg-
ments due to its comparatively better value proposition. We consider 
two pathways along which the innovation ecosystem’ structure can be 
reconfigures to deliver this new value proposition, which emphasises 
the reduced price and complexity of the product or service. 
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First, the ecosystem structure can attain efficiency and economies of 
scope by dispensing with redundant processes while combining other 
processes (e.g. through insourcing, and merger and acquisition activi-
ties). The value blueprint of the disruptive innovation ecosystem will 
therefore be simpler, pronounced by a lower number of actors and 
connections in comparison to that of the incumbent ecosystem value 
blueprint. Combination and subtraction are likely to be the dominant 
modes of ecosystem value blueprint reconfiguration when following 
this pathway. Second, and somewhat in contrast to the first pathway, 
the price and design benefits can materialise from the introduction of 
a platform architecture and increased modularisation (Gawer, 2014; 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). Following this pathway, unit price re-
duction and product design simplicity results from the division and 
distribution of multiple tasks previously undertaken by a single actor 
to a number of specialised actors (e.g. through outsourcing activi-
ties). Separation and addition are likely to be the dominant modes of 
ecosystem value blueprint reconfiguration when this second pathway 
is followed. 
In light of the two reconfiguration pathways we have considered, the 
natural line of inquiry pertains to the conditions that promote one 
pathway in preference to the other. We argue that an incumbent inno-
vation ecosystem, which delivers a product or service that is modular 
rather than integrated in its design, will be more susceptible to dis-
ruption by an innovation that is platform-based and boasts an even 
higher degree of modularity – thus promoting the second pathway. 
In this instance, we suggest that the modular design of the incum-
bent product or service essentially sets the precedent for the disrupti-
ve innovation, which can readily accentuate and refine this modular 
concept. The reduced unit price and complexity of the disruptive in-
novation can therefore be achieved through an ecosystem structure 
that centres about a distinct, core platform, for which a multitude 
of modules can be developed by numerous actors who specialise in 
the provision of complementary assets (Teece, 1986; Sawhney, 1998; 
Gawer, 2014). By contrast, we argue that the disruption of an incum-
bent product or service, which is not modular in its design, cannot be 
as readily attained through such platform and modularisation stra-
tegy, given the greater difficulty in its decomposition. Other strate-
gies are therefore likely to be sought to lower price and reduce design 
complexity – thus promoting the first pathway. These arguments lead 
us to make the following propositions with respect to the reconfigu-
ration of the innovation ecosystem value blueprint.
Proposition 1: The reconfiguration of the incumbent innovation 
ecosystem value blueprint, subsequent to low-end disruption, is 
likely to be characterised by separation and addition when its pro-
duct or service is modular. 
Proposition 2: The reconfiguration of the incumbent innovation 
ecosystem value blueprint, subsequent to low-end disruption, is 
likely to be characterised by combination and subtraction when its 
product or service is not modular. 
These propositions extend the effects of low-end disruption to the in-
novation ecosystem in its entirety. In Proposition 1, we suggest that 
new actors are likely to enter the ecosystem, especially as complemen-
tors to the platform leader, when the incumbent product or service 
is modular. By contrast, Proposition 2 offers caution to incumbent 
suppliers, intermediaries, and complementors, which face the possi-
bility of exiting the ecosystem with the advent of disruption, when the 
incumbent product or service is not modular.
Further to the traditional, low-end disruption discussed so far, 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) underline an additional mecha-
nism through which an incumbent firm faces disruptive compe-
tition. This second type of disruption – referred to as new market 
disruption – does not bring the incumbent and the new entrant 
into direct competition. Rather, in the words of Christensen and 
Raynor, “new market disruptions compete against non-consump-
tion” and not the incumbent. In this manner, the period following 
the inception of the new market innovation is marked by the crea-
tion of consumption. As the innovation’s performance improves, 
customers from the traditional market gradually migrate to the 
new context that had been marked by non-consumption at its 
outset. The response of incumbent firms to the creation of a new 
market is one of ignorance, eventually leading to their downfall 
as the traditional market is siphoned away. This mechanism is di-
fferent to that of low-end disruption, which is pronounced by the 
disruptive innovation’s invasion of the mainstream market with 
a low-cost business model, forcing incumbents to flee to higher 
segments of the market. Christensen and Raynor (2003) add that 
many disruptive changes are hybrids of low-end and new market 
disruption, whereby, having created a new market, the disruptive 
innovation begins to attract and pull the lower echelons of the ma-
instream market. 
Unlike low-end disruptions, new market disruptions do not necessa-
rily compete on lower price. As a consequence, the incumbent inno-
vation ecosystem faces competition from a new market or hybrid dis-
ruptive innovation, which offers a better value proposition in the eyes 
of the customer, despite its higher unit price. Such a value proposition 
may, for instance, provide additional product or service features, or 
enhance the functionality of existing ones. Under these conditions, 
we argue that the comparatively better value offering is likely to result 
from the addition of complementary assets to the disruptive innova-
tion ecosystem structure. We subsequently offer the following propo-
sition with respect to the reconfiguration of the innovation ecosystem 
value blueprint. 
Proposition 3: The reconfiguration of the incumbent innovation 
ecosystem value blueprint, subsequent to new market disruption 
created by an innovation of higher price vis-à-vis the incumbent, is 
likely to be characterised by addition. 
This proposition suggests that new market disruptions can provide 
opportunities for new businesses to enter the innovation ecosystem, 
following a similar logic to that of Proposition 2. Especially when the 
product or service is modular in its design, we posit that these new 
entrants are likely to assume complementary positons that enhance 
the value offering of the platform leader.
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Illustrations
To examine our propositions, we selected three illustrative, histori-
cal cases to provide contrasting results. These cases were drawn from 
different contexts, and allowed us to access rich information to study 
the value blueprint reconfigurations of respective innovation ecosys-
tems. We firstly focus on Bakelite, and its use as an electric insulator 
that rendered it a disruptive innovation, and which changed the mar-
ket hitherto dominated by Shellac, a natural material with isolating 
properties. Secondly, we look at the microwave oven, a disruptive in-
novation that changed customer demand in the cooking market by 
enabling fast cooking and allowing preparation of ready deep-frozen 
meals. And we thirdly examine the Canon photocopier, which emer-
ged as a disruptive innovation through its much simpler design with 
respect to the incumbent Xerox copier.
For each illustrative case a systematic literature search was perfor-
med using keywords representing the names of the innovations (i.e. 
Bakelite, microwave oven, and copier) and additional keywords such 
as ‘history’ and ‘diffusion’ to filter the acquired literature. In turn, the 
cases were studied systematically to address the following aspects for 
each instance of disruption:
i. description of the incumbent technology, and its ecosystem 
value blueprint prior to being challenged by the disruptive in-
novation
ii. historical account of the disruptive innovation’s development 
and the creation of the disruptive innovation ecosystem
iii. review of the innovation ecosystem value blueprint reconfi-
guration
Bakelite
Bakelite is one of the first fully synthetic plastics, and like other ma-
terials, has been used in many applications. We will focus on a parti-
cular episode in the history of Bakelite, namely, its use as an insulator 
of electric wires, which illustrates the disruptive nature of the innova-
tion as it entered competition against Shellac, a natural material tra-
ditionally used for this same purpose.
Description of the incumbent technology (Shellac) 
Shellac is a natural material produced by an insect. The lac that is 
produced by the insect is left on branches of trees that host the insect. 
At first the lac was seen as a dye, but when aniline dyes were disco-
vered, the lac was more and more applied as a kind of varnish from 
the late 19th century onwards (Hicks, 1961), used for many purposes 
(Parry, 1935; Hicks, 1961). Some of the applications of Shellac include 
its use as an essential component in phonograph records, as an elec-
trical insulating material, and as an ingredient in the making of hats 
and grinding wheels (Hicks, 1961). For the purposes of this study, 
however, we focus our attention on the use of Shellac as an electric 
insulating material. 
In the 19th century electricity and electronics became increasingly 
important in our society. In the second half of the 19th century te-
legraphy and later telephony required insulation of electric wires 
(Huurdeman, 2003). In the late 19th century a greater number of ci-
ties in the US and Europe were equipped with electricity networks 
and many rural areas were equipped with local electricity networks 
(Righter, 1996). All of these activities required considerable amounts 
of insulating material. Shellac had unique properties in this respect.
The production of Shellac as a natural material was mainly based in spe-
cific regions in India. The process of cultivating the material, taking the 
lac from the branches, preparing and refining the material, gathering and 
transporting the lac, trading it to Europe or the US entailed a complete 
and fine-branched network (Parry, 1935). After the transport from Cal-
cutta, India, (the regional trading and transport centre near production) 
to London, UK, (the regional centre where Shellac was sold to users in 
Europe) the material could be further refined and reworked into pho-
nograph records, insulation for electric wires, and so on. 
The increasing demand and the limited supply of Shellac drove up the 
price of the material, however, which was further exacerbated during 
the Second World War. Shellac had many military applications and be-
cause of its strategic importance the supply of the material came under 
Government control. When these controls were lifted after the war, the 
prices rose to a prohibitive level for uses such as record production, 
thereby stimulating the search for synthetic resins (Hicks, 1961). 
Development of the disruptive innovation (Bakelite)
In the second half of the 19th century many scientists and practitio-
ners tried to create plastic-like materials. At first these materials were 
based on cellulose that was treated with chemicals. From these efforts 
materials such as Rayon, Celluloid and other semi-synthetic materials 
were created (Kauffman, 1993; Townsend, 1993). Later on, precursors 
of the fully synthetic plastics were created such as Parkesine but these 
materials were unsuccessful in the market. Bakelite was one of the 
first successful synthetic materials. 
Baekeland, the chemist who developed Bakelite, recognised that the 
demand for Shellac would outpace supply because of the increased 
importance of electricity in Western Societies and the limitation in 
supply. He started to work in a barn behind his house in 1904 and 
was able to create the first true plastic in 1907. Small-scale production 
of the plastic began from the same location. Later on in 1911, when 
demand grew, large-scale production started in a factory.
‘Baekeland’s first patent in the field had been granted in 1906; in all, 
he took out more than 400 patents related to the manufacture and 
applications of Bakelite. He started semi-commercial production in his 
laboratory and, in 1910, when daily output had reached 180 litres, (most 
of it for electrical insulators), he formed a U.S. company to manufacture 
and market his new industrial material. By 1930, the Bakelite 
Corporation occupied a 128-acre plant at Bound Brook, New Jersey.’
(http://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/education/whatischemistry/
landmarks/bakelite.html#invention-of-bakelite)
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The disruptive nature of Bakelite was born from its good perfor-
mance, but most importantly, from its potential to be produced in 
an industrial process. This production characteristic had two posi-
tive effects. Firstly, the potential for higher supply quantity lowe-
red the price of the new technology with respect to that of the in-
cumbent Shellac. Secondly, the capacity to control the production 
process meant that higher consistency in quality could be obtained. 
This value attribute could hardly be provided by the natural material 
Shellac, the quality of which depended heavily on its geographic ori-
gin of the raw material and the conditions of the particular season 
in which this material had been cultivated. The quantity and quality 
performance attributes displayed by Bakelite were initially valued 
by the emerging electrical and automobile industries, which requi-
red extraordinarily high resistance to electricity, as well as to heat 
and chemical action.
Reconfiguration of the innovation ecosystem value blueprint 
From the description above, we are able to discern some of the key 
actors that constituted the incumbent ecosystem centring on Shellac 
technology. Positioning the value blueprint about the focal firm as 
the actor that produces insulation for electric wires using Shellac, 
the direct customers appear to be the firms that provide electricity 
networks (electricity providers). Upstream from the focal firm, the-
re is a complex network of suppliers responsible for the cultivation, 
collection, and refinement of the material (e.g. in India), as well as 
actors engaged in intercontinental transportation of this material 
and local distributors of this material that may supply directly to 
the focal firm. 
We observe a rather substantial reconfiguration of the incumbent va-
lue blueprint when we contrast it to that of the Bakelite ecosystem 
at the time of disruption. The value blueprint created about the 
disruptive Bakelite innovation began with Baekeland’s invention, 
and gradually increased in the number of actors as large-scale 
production was attained. The fully synthetic nature of Bakelite, in 
stark contrast to the natural material that forms Shellac, created 
an ecosystem that was largely locally based. Together with this, the 
modern industrial system necessary to produce Bakelite rendered 
the actors needed to cultivate, collect, and refine raw materials re-
dundant, as well as the actors associated with long distance trans-
portation. The disruption of the Shellac innovation ecosystem by 
Bakelite subsequently had severe effects on the survival of actors 
upstream from the focal firm.
The microwave oven
The value proposition of the microwave oven was a new, very fast 
way of cooking. The first microwave ovens were applied in market 
niches where speed was considered as an important value attribute 
and space was limited, such as in restaurants, trains, and ships. These 
performance attributes, which were central to the development of this 
innovation eventually changed the traditional market for cooking in 
households.
Description of the incumbent technology (traditional ovens) 
Prior to the advent of the microwave oven, the traditional cooking 
technologies included cooking stoves and ovens fuelled by gas and 
electricity, as well as barbeques or grills that burned coal and wood. 
We consider these as the incumbent technologies that were (partia-
lly) disrupted by the microwave oven innovation. These incumbent 
appliances (still continuing their market presence, albeit for slower, 
more intricate cooking procedures) work on several principles. The 
dominant principle is that water is heated and food is boiled, but 
other principles such as steaming, grilling or roasting are also tradi-
tionally used. These principles of cooking nevertheless require a lot of 
energy and time.
Development of the disruptive innovation (microwave oven)
The innovation of the microwave oven was made possible with the 
discovery of a crucial component in the early 20th century, namely, 
the microwave tube. Remaining merely as an invention in its early 
days, the worldwide economic depression of the late 1920s and early 
1930s forced power tube manufacturers to explore new applications 
for the microwave tubes. 
‘There is some reference in the “early history of industrial elec-
tronics,” (..) to the fact that the principal high-power tube ma-
nufacturers were forced by the depression years to find new tube 
applications and some of these were in heating—mostly in in-
duction heating and early diathermy work.’ 
(Osepchuk, 1984, p.1202) 
Several market niches that could transform the invention into a com-
mercialised innovation were explored by the firm Raytheon. Military 
application was one of the most promising, whereby microwave tubes 
were applied in radars during the Second World War. However, the 
end of World War II would vanish Raytheon’s lucrative military con-
tracts. The accompanying revenue drop required Raytheon to explore 
new civilian applications (Hammack, 2005). Among other possible 
civilian applications, employing microwave principals for cooking 
was a radically new idea. 
‘The commonly used radio wave frequency is roughly 2,500 me-
gahertz (2.5 gigahertz). Radio waves in this frequency range have 
an interesting property: they are absorbed by water, fats and su-
gars. When they are absorbed they are converted directly into 
atomic motion -- heat. Microwaves in this frequency range have 
another interesting property: they are not absorbed by most plas-
tics, glass or ceramics. Metal reflects microwaves, which is why 
metal pans do not work well in a microwave oven. In microwave 
cooking, the radio waves penetrate the food and excite water and 
fat molecules pretty much evenly throughout the food. There is 
no “heat having to migrate toward the interior by conduction”. 
There is heat everywhere all at once because the molecules are 
all excited together.’ 
(Osepchuk, 1984, p.1201)
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2017. Volume 12, Issue 3
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://jotmi.org)
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios. 15
Having found a civilian application for the microwave tube, na-
mely cooking, the microwave oven entered market niches where its 
functional attributes (speed of cooking and smaller space require-
ments) were appreciated. In time, the microwave oven was able to 
enter the mainstream market of household cooking, and upon ente-
ring changed the value perception of this market. With its capacity 
to cook as well as the incumbent technologies (ovens and stoves), it 
introduced the added benefits of convenience and speed that enabled 
it to gain a stronghold in household kitchens. Moreover, convenience 
was not only provided by the speed of cooking per se but also by the 
opportunity to quickly prepare deep-frozen meals. Nevertheless, the 
first microwave ovens were rather expensive and therefore attracted 
the less price-sensitive segments of the mainstream market initially. 
Over time, however, with lowering of prices, the innovation was able 
to penetrate into the more price-sensitive segments as well.
Reconfiguration of the innovation ecosystem value blueprint
The comparison of the incumbent and disruptive value blueprints 
reveals some important differences. The value blueprint of the long 
established, incumbent technologies are pronounced by the presence 
of complementors that provide energy sources, such as coal, gas, 
or electricity, as well as cookware (e.g. oven proof casserole dishes, 
pots, and pans). In this manner, the end-user integrates the hardware 
(the traditional oven and stove) with the energy components and 
cookware to enable cooking. This complementarity extends the value 
blueprint off the direct path of value creation with the presence of a 
host of actors that compete in their respective industries. 
The entrance of the microwave oven into the household kitchen mar-
ket does not fully align with the traditional view of disruptive change, 
however. The innovation offers a different set of value attributes with 
respect to the incumbent, although it has, for the most part, assumed 
a complementary role rather than one of complete substitution. Hen-
ce, many kitchens have been equipped with both the traditional oven 
as well as the microwave oven. Nevertheless, the disruptive nature of 
the microwave oven is manifested in its attraction of many end-users 
away from the incumbent technologies over time. This process has 
been enabled by the enhancement of holistic value that the end-user 
has been able to acquire from the innovation. Most notably, the new 
principle of cooking endowed by the microwave oven stimulated the 
innovation of new ways of food preparation and new ways of food 
packaging. Ready and pre-packaged meals can be frozen and subse-
quently heated quickly if the proper packaging materials are applied. 
This emergent chain of food production and packaging (addition of 
new actors into the ecosystem) aligns with the value attributes of spe-
ed and convenience consumers associate with the microwave oven 
instead of remarkably improved energy efficiency that was considered 
as key advantage in the original patent application (Osepchuk, 1984). 
At the same time, some of the actors that have provided cookware for 
the traditional oven have been able to contribute also to the microwa-
ve oven value blueprint by developing microwave safe dishes. 
 
The photocopier
The Canon photocopier disrupted the mainstream market dominated 
by the incumbent Xerox copier, assuming a highly competitive po-
sition through the simplicity of its design. Despite displaying lower 
performance than the incumbent at the outset, its lower price allowed 
it to penetrate particular market segments, namely, the SMEs (small 
and medium-sized enterprises).
Description of the incumbent technology (Xerox copier) 
The early photocopier industry was dominated by the prevailing bu-
siness model of wet photography and dry thermal processing, akin 
to the ‘razor’ and ‘razor-blade’ model. A typical machine would cost 
around $300 (Chesbrough, 2003). Xerox, the pioneer of photocopier 
machines based on the electrostatic charge process, estimated that the 
manufacturing cost of their machines would be about $2000, while 
the variable cost of supplies would remain roughly the same (Ches-
brough, 2003). This created a major challenge for the commerciali-
sation of the technology: the ‘razor’ was much more expensive while 
the ‘blade’ was no cheaper. The company used a different business 
model to overcome the high equipment cost, offering customers the 
option to lease. Customers needed to pay a nominal $95 per month to 
lease a machine, and paid a nominal amount per copy. With this new 
business model Xerox had essentially taken a bet as it assumed that 
the number of copies would increase considerably, and only then was 
it possible to make a profit. 
Commensurate with their new approach, Xerox introduced the mo-
del 914 to the market in 1959. The 914’s business model generated 
more revenue when more copies were made, which established the 
logic for Xerox’s copier business (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2003). The company focused on high-speed, high-volume machi-
nes, which inevitably established the paradigm for technological 
development within the industry. As it was complex to repair these 
machines, Xerox decided to use its own sales force to lease as well 
as to repair the machines, simultaneously dispensing with the re-
quirement of partnerships. Xerox manufactured its products, made 
its own paper to provide optimal feeding and even provided finance 
for customers.
Development of the disruptive innovation (Canon copier)
Meanwhile Xerox’s monopoly ended abruptly in the late 1960s, 
when the Federal Trade Commission forced the company to license 
its patents to competitors. IBM and Kodak entered this newly crea-
ted industry. Both these companies focused on high-speed, high-
volume copiers (i.e. following the same technological trajectory set 
by Xerox), using a business model similar to that of Xerox. Funda-
mentally, their strategy was to capture a share of Xerox’s market by 
offering better products or better services at lower prices. Neither 
of these companies, however, managed to take a decent share in the 
copier business. 
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In the meantime, Canon found a way to circumvent Xerox’s patents 
by designing a distinctive strategic position to enter the photocopier 
industry. In contrast to Xerox, Canon focused on SMEs as its target 
market and decided to sell its machines through a dealer network 
rather than leasing them. While Xerox emphasised the speed of its 
machines, Canon elected to concentrate on affordability and ease of 
use and repair as its differentiating features. The product design was 
simplified so customers could replace spare parts and could perform 
simple repairs. In this way, a dealer network was able to handle the 
customer contacts. 
Canon was also able to correct Xerox’s failed attempt at the ‘razor’ and 
‘razor-blade’ model by asking a modest ‘box cost’ for the copier and 
earning higher margins on cartridges. Moreover, Canon continued to 
depart from Xerox’s business model by outsourcing the distribution, 
service, support, and financing functions (Chesbrough, 2003). Xerox 
attempted to enter this mass market in response, but learned that the 
business model was entirely different. In 2001, the company was com-
pelled to abandon its presence in the low-end market, and decided to 
stick to its original high-end market segment. 
The Canon copier subsequently disrupted the market as a cheap and 
simple alternative to the incumbent copier made by Xerox. It altered 
the value perception of the mainstream market, emphasising the low 
price for the copying machine and the convenience of simple pro-
cedures required to replace parts of the machine when repairs were 
required. 
Reconfiguration of the innovation ecosystem value blueprint
This case study illustrates a radical shift in the value blueprint of the 
incumbent innovation ecosystem as it is supplanted by the disrupti-
ve ecosystem. The former has been shaped by Xerox’s business mo-
del which has been pronounced by a high level of internalisation of 
functions. In addition to producing its own machines, the company 
had decided to horizontally integrate certain complementary pro-
ducts and services, including paper, leasing, repair, and financing. The 
resulting incumbent value blueprint had relatively few complemen-
tors. In stark contrast, Canon’s disruptive value blueprint was mar-
ked by a much larger network of collaborators. By outsourcing key 
functions that Xerox had internalised, Canon was able to reduce the 
price tag of its copiers. Canon had essentially provided a totally new 
platform with clear interfacing that allowed modules (products and 
services) to be readily connected to Canon’s core product. This strate-
gy added new actors to the value blueprint both as intermediaries and 
complementors, dealing with functions such as distribution, service, 
support, and financing.
Discussion and conclusions
The objective of our paper has been to explain how innovation 
ecosystems change under the influence of disruptive innovations, and 
consequently, to identify the variables that may explain the reconfi-
guration of the ecosystem’s value blueprint. In essence, the disruptive 
process brings two innovation ecosystems into rivalry, whereby the 
ecosystems provide different value propositions, and therefore have 
different value blueprints (Adner, 2017). The reconfiguration of the 
incumbent ecosystem value blueprint through addition, subtraction, 
relocation, separation, and combination mechanisms, are the results 
of this rivalry. The Bakelite case, for example, underlined the sub-
traction of multiple actors in the supply side of the incumbent value 
blueprint as new actors specialised in industrial production entered 
the fray. In the microwave oven case we observed the addition of new 
complementors, and our study of the photocopier case revealed sig-
nificant reconfiguration of the incumbent value blueprint marked by 
the separation of tasks that were owned by new actors. The various 
modes of value blueprint reconfiguration we have divulged through 
these illustrative cases are presented in Table 1. 
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The illustrative cases demonstrated that the type of disruptive change 
is a primary determinant of the mode of value blueprint reconfigu-
ration. Two of the cases considered in our paper – Bakelite and the 
Canon photocopier – underline low-end disruption. In both of these 
cases, the disruptive innovation offered a lower price than the incum-
bent innovation, namely, Shellac and the Xerox copier, respectively. 
The disruptive innovations were able to outcompete their incumbent 
rivals because of their superior value propositions, which not only 
delivered relatively lower price tags, but also additional benefits, in-
cluding quantity abundance as compared to the limited availability 
of Shellac in the case of Bakelite, and flexibility and ease of usage as 
compared to the strict operation procedures of the Xerox copier in 
the case of the Canon photocopier. 
When we compare the value blueprint reconfigurations, however, we 
observe different outcomes. In the Bakelite case, the lower price of the 
innovation appears to have been acquired through two processes: (i) 
a radical change in production methods (i.e. a synthetic, industrial 
process as opposed to the quasi-agricultural process for Shellac); and 
(ii) the redundancy of transportation links. The impact on the ecosys-
tem value blueprint has been that of combination – bringing together 
different processes under an industrial roof – and subtraction – elimi-
nation of the intercontinental transport system. By contrast, Canon’s 
photocopier achieved a lower unit price, vis-à-vis the incumbent Xe-
rox copier, through its simpler design that enabled the outsourcing 
of a set of activities (e.g. distribution and service) to other actors. In 
this manner, the overall value acquired by the end-user remained in-
tact, but the price of the Canon copier itself was competitively lower. 
The reconfiguration of the value blueprint subsequently emphasises 
separation, in other words, outsourcing of tasks to different actors. 
Our cross-case comparison suggests there to be two modes of value 
blueprint reconfiguration for cases of low-end disruptive change that 
focus on cost reduction, which align with our Propositions 1 and 2.
The microwave oven, by contrast, is an illustration of a new market 
disruptive innovation, not having entered direct competition with 
incumbent technologies (i.e. traditional ovens), but rather against 
non-consumption, creating a new market for faster cooking. And, at 
closer inspection, we may classify the Canon photocopier as a hybrid 
disruptive innovation, which simultaneously carries low-end disrup-
tion traits (i.e. a simpler and cheaper alternative to the incumbent Xe-
rox machines), as well as new market disruption traits. In this man-
ner, the Canon photocopier’s ability to be easily positioned in offices 
meant that it established a new market (i.e. for office occupants who 
could not readily access Xerox copiers), gradually pulling the low-end 
of the existing market into this new context. 
When we evaluate the value blueprint reconfigurations of the mi-
crowave oven and Canon photocopier cases, we observe some notable 
differences. For the former, we see that the unit cost of the innovation 
is high and the product is unlikely to attract customers on the pri-
ce attribute alone. Rather, we claim that the consumer’s ‘net utility 
threshold’, in other words, “the highest price a consumer will pay for 
a product that just meets her functional threshold” (Adner, 2002), is 
surpassed due to the systemic value that they are able to garner with 
the availability of complementary products (e.g. ready deep-frozen 
meals) and the combined effect that the microwave oven and com-
plementarities have on the ease of storing food and the speed and 
ease of the cooking process. This complementarity is bestowed by the 
addition of new actors to the ecosystem’s value blueprint, which spe-
cialise in providing complementary products. Thus, the higher cost of 
the disruptive innovation is coupled with (and compensated by) the 
availability of holistic, additional value the customer is able to acqui-
re. This observation aligns with Proposition 3. By contrast, we obser-
ve a different mechanism for the case of Canon’s photocopier. Unlike 
the microwave oven, Canon’s product is offered at a lower price with 
respect to the incumbent, Xerox, and is likely to be less demanding 
on the consumers’ willingness to pay. Hence, we believe that the avai-
lability of complementary products and services, additional to those 
outsourced, is not a vital requirement in this and similar hybrid cases 
where the new market disruption is brought about by an innovation 
with lower cost. 
The cases we have considered here for illustrative purposes are well 
known, historical ones. However, we can also extrapolate the above 
discussion to more contemporary disruptive changes, especially tho-
se that have been enabled through digital technologies such as the 
internet. Take for example the disruption of the traditional hotel 
and accommodation industry by Airbnb’s online service innovation. 
Airbnb’s business model works simply on the possibility of common 
individuals’ capacity to offer a similar value proposition (i.e. overnight 
accommodation) as traditional hotels, with added benefits such as fle-
xibility of location and variety of accommodation options, but most 
importantly, a price reduction. Airbnb’s online platform allows indi-
viduals to assume the role of both accommodation provider (i.e. host) 
and accommodation seeker (i.e. guest). Hence, Airbnb has adopted a 
clear example of a two-sided market or an ecosystem platform, where 
users play the consumer as well as the supplier role (Gawer, 2014; 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). The infamous case of Uber follows a 
very similar logic, as it provides a (potentially) disruptive business 
model premised on common individuals’ capacity to offer rides to 
other individuals, a value proposition that is more or less the same as 
that of traditional taxi companies. However, its disruptive potential, 
in this instance against limousine services (Christensen et al., 2015), 
rests on the benefit of convenience, but again most importantly on its 
price advantage in comparison to the incumbent value proposition. 
When we compare the contemporary case of Airbnb, and the histori-
cal case of the Canon photocopier, we can see differences in the man-
ner of disruption. Following Gawer’s (2014) arguments, we perceive 
Xerox, which had centred its business on an internal platform (i.e. 
simply as “a firm and its sub-units”), to have been disrupted by Ca-
non, which had developed a supply-chain platform (i.e. an architec-
ture that underlines “an assembler and its suppliers”). By comparison, 
Airbnb has implemented a different strategy to that of Canon’s, in the 
form of an ecosystem platform (i.e. “a platform leader and its comple-
mentors”) to disrupt the supply-chain platform of the incumbent ho-
tel business. Notwithstanding these apparent differences, we observe 
that the direction of change appears to be the same. In other words, in 
each of the cases considered, the incumbent innovation ecosystem is 
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disrupted by another that boasts a platform broader in its scope, cou-
pled with increased openness of interfaces, which allow more actors 
to join the milieu to enhance innovation and diversity of capabilities 
(Gawer, 2014). This repeating pattern in both historical and contem-
porary cases affords greater confidence in our propositions related to 
the low-end disruption of innovation ecosystems.
Future research
We believe that in-depth qualitative studies can examine several ty-
pes of propositions related to the reconfiguration of ecosystems in 
addition to the ones that we have started with. To uncover these pro-
positions, we consider a generic process model that comprises the 
incumbent value blueprint, the type of disruption, and the new value 
blueprint that results from this disruption, all of which operate in an 
embedding context (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Generic process model of value blueprint reconfiguration. 
We can derive new propositions for further research by specifying 
the characteristics or variations of each component in the above figu-
re. For instance, the incumbent value blueprint characteristic that we 
have emphasised in formulating Propositions 1 and 2 has been the de-
gree of modularity of the incumbent product. This is a logical choice 
in hindsight as modularity influences the ecosystem’s flexibility and 
adaptability, thus reducing its vulnerability to disruption. However, 
there are additional characteristics of the incumbent value blueprint 
that can help us establish propositions related to the manner of recon-
figuration, including the structure and the composition of the cons-
tellation of actors that make up the entire ecosystem (Adner, 2017). If 
the value blueprint structure is very rigid with actors that fulfil highly 
specialised tasks, then disruption might lead to substitution of the en-
tire constellation. By contrast, a more flexible structure where actors 
can fulfil multiple tasks and be connected via multiple links to other 
actors, can possibly foster reconfiguration without generating a high 
rate of obsolescence. 
When we consider the types of disruption we specified in our work, 
we have seen that the new ecosystem can completely substitute for 
the incumbent, as was the case for the Bakelite vis-à-vis the Shellac 
ecosystem. In other cases, however (e.g. Canon versus Xerox, and Mi-
crowave oven versus the traditional stove), it appears that the new 
and the incumbent ecosystem can co-exist for prolonged periods of 
time without substituting each other completely. We think that these 
outcomes could be taken into account in formulating further propo-
sitions, such as those focused on the conditions that favour complete 
substitution versus co-existence of ecosystems. Another type of dis-
ruption that we have not examined in our work, but which has been 
studied in the wider literature, is the process of ‘high-end’ disruption 
(e.g. Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006; Yu and Hang, 2010). This pro-
cess describes products that originally enter the high-end niches of a 
market (i.e. generally with a high price tag and high quality levels), 
but which later move downwards to disrupt the mainstream market, 
sketching an opposite direction of movement to the traditional low-
end process. We believe that additional propositions could be deve-
loped to capture how high-end disruptions differ from low-end dis-
ruptions in reconfiguring the innovation ecosystem value blueprint.
Finally, the embedding context can play a vital role in how the incum-
bent value blueprint is reconfigured subject to disruption. Each of our 
illustrative cases has drawn attention to this point. For instance, the 
increase in demand for Shellac originated outside the Shellac market, 
namely, from the increase of electrical infrastructures and equipment 
in society, which required more insulating material for electrical wi-
res. In the development of the microwave oven, we observed the im-
pact of the end of World War II, a contextual factor that compelled 
the exploration of civilian, rather than military, applications for the 
microwave tube. In the case of the photocopier, Canon’s disruptive 
innovation was essentially triggered in the 1960s when the Federal 
Trade Commission forced Xerox to license its patents to competitors. 
Taking these notions into consideration collectively, we may trans-
form the generic process model of value blueprint disruption (Figure 
2) into a simplified static model specifying the causes of value blue-
print reconfiguration, as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Stylised model explaining the causes of value blueprint 
reconfiguration.
The causal model presented in Figure 3 can guide future research 
initiatives addressing the important issue of ecosystem disruption. 
Research examining how value blueprint characteristics, and/or the 
type of disruption leads to reconfiguration can provide valuable in-
sights for incumbent firms making various strategic decisions. Ove-
rall, we believe that the ecosystem perspective provides an important 
avenue for continued research from the practitioner’s point of view, 
in particular. This is because the prevailing theoretical frameworks 
dealing with the influence of radical, abrupt changes in the techno-
logical landscape has hitherto focused on a narrow scope, namely, 
the ensuing direct rivalry among firms. Yet, firms are embedded in 
networked environments, collaborating with a host of other actors to 
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create value to customers in the form of systemic products and servi-
ces. We therefore believe that the continuation of this line of research 
will shed light on the competitive position of suppliers, intermedia-
ries, and complementors, as well as customers, when an innovation 
disrupts an existing ecosystem.
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